blackheath philosophy forum

PRECIS OF ADRIAN HEATHCOTE'S PAPER DELIVERED ON SATURDAY 21 APRIL, 2007, AT THE BLACKHEATH FORUM

    Adrian Heathcote speaking at the Forum: The Dangerousness of Truth

    • We call the 15th Century the ‘Renaissance’ and we call the 18th Century the ‘Age of Enlightenment’.
    If we could look back on the 20th Century from the standpoint of, say, 500 yrs hence,
    what should we call it? What are we likely to call it?

    • My suggestion would be: the ‘Age of Lies’. Or perhaps the ‘Age of Untruthfulness’.

    • Perhaps some 90% of what is thought, in academic terms. Most of the 20th Century’s ‘-isms’. Almost
    all of the doctrines about religion. Much of psychology and sociology. Most of Economics. Much of academic philosophy.

    • I think in the first half of the 20th Century there were many mistakes made, but there was no
    intention to deceive, but since 1960 I don’t think the mistakes can be said to be innocent. The
    deceptions have become quite deliberate.

    • Example from physics — string theory. See Lee Smolin and Peter Woit’s recent books.

    • It is not possible for these severe problems to exist without there being some concomitant problem
    about truth to ease their path. The denial of facts; the philosophical controversies about
    truth; the pretense that there are serious alternative theories of truth; all play their part in weakening
    the academic resolve to pursue the truth. Many academics now do not want there to be
    facts and objective truth: it would be a positive hindrance along their career path.

    • Two views about truth which have this character: Relativism and Disquotationalism.

    1. Liar paradox. (Eubulides of Miletus) Cretan paradox. (Epimenides)
    2. Nihilism about Truth.

    Let us assume that the statement N: There is no truth, correctly describes how things
    are, so that there is no truth. Now since what it takes for a statement to be true is
    nothing more than that it correctly describes how things are, N must be true. But
    since it is true it is an example of the very thing which it says doesn’t exist. So N is
    false. It is not the case that there is no truth.

    3. Relativism about truth. Plato’s Refutation. (Theaetetus)
    Let us assume that the statement R: All truth is relative, correctly describes how things
    are, so that all truth is relative. Now since what it takes for a statement to be absolutely
    true is nothing more than that it correctly describes how things are, R must
    be absolutely true. But since it is absolutely true it is an example of the very thing
    which it says doesn’t exist. So it is false—and absolutely so. It is not the case that all
    truth is relative.

    4. Two common but incorrect responses:
    (a) “The argument begs the question by assuming that some statements are absolutely true.”
    But it doesn’t at all. Other formulations might, but that is irrelevant: we just need one
    formulation that isn’t question begging – and this one isn’t.
    (b) “There could be only one truth, or absolute truth.” But Nihilism (or Relativism) is not
    meant to be an empirical generalisation. It is meant to be a conceptual truth. It can’t
    survive even one counterexample.

    Disquotationalism: truth without facts, but with all instances of the T-schema.
    Argument against disquotationalism.

    - Adrian Heathcote Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Sydney